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Abstract Within a relatively short period of 30 years, public acceptance of voluntary
childlessness has increased enormously in the Netherlands. In this paper, we address two
research questions, which we answer with data from 13 waves of the repeated cross-
sectional survey Cultural Change in the Netherlands (CCN, 1965–1996). First, we inves-
tigate to what extent the increasing permissiveness is due to cohort replacement and to
intra-cohort change. We ﬁnd that between 1965 and 1980 the change is primarily due to
intra-cohort (period) effects, whereas cohort replacement has become more important since
1980. Second, we address the question which social categories constitute the 10% of the
population who do not accept voluntary childlessness. Church attendance—and not reli-
giosity or religious socialization—turns out to be the most important factor. Low levels of
income and education also negatively affect the acceptance of voluntary childless.
Keywords Social change  Voluntary childlessness  Public opinion 
The Netherlands
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate sociological aspects of the rapid increase in the public
acceptance of voluntary childlessness in the Netherlands. In the 1960s, only 20% of the
Dutch population accepted that a couple preferred to remain childless, and in the 1990s this
proportion has increased to 90% (Survey CCN 1965–1996, own calculations). This strong
change in the social norms about family planning has gone together with declining fertility
rates. International comparisons show that the decline in fertility has had a comparatively
strong momentum in the Netherlands: In 1960 the Dutch fertility rate was above the
European average and in 1980 it was below the European average (Castles 2003).
Childlessness concerns both social scientists and policy makers, and quite some
research has focussed on the individual determinants and consequences of childlessness
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Others have been more interested in more general causes and consequences of increasing
childlessness. Van de Kaa (1987) and Lesthaeghe (1995) interpreted the decline in fertility
rates as part of a broad process of social change, which they labelled as the Second
Demographic Transition. Important elements of this process are the rise of cohabitation as
an alternative to marriage, the increasing age at motherhood, and the increase of divorce.
These behavioural issues have followed similar patterns, and, importantly, have gone hand
in hand with changes in values on fertility and family planning.
One of the most important instigators of the Second Demographic Transition is seen in
the changing division of labour between men and women as a result of increases in
women’s educational attainment and in the growing permissiveness of the labour market
participation of women, especially of mothers. The main argument is that rising levels of
women’s human capital have increased the costs of having children. Simultaneously, there
has been technological innovation with regard to birth control and family planning.
Contraceptive methods have become widely available, and parenthood has become more a
choice than an almost unavoidable event (Hakim 2003).
The shifts in fertility behaviour and fertility norms in the Netherlands are shown in
Fig. 1.The statistics display a sharp decline in the number of births in the Netherlands. The
birth rate dropped from about 90 children per 1,000 women aged 15–50 years in 1965 to 50
children per 1,000 women in the 1980s. In the same period, the Dutch population has
become more permissive towards voluntary childlessness, as indicated by the dots. The
strong decline in norms is the object of our study.
1
We address two research questions about the change in public support for voluntary
childlessness in the Netherlands. First, we investigate whether the overall change has come
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acceptance of childlessness relative number of live born children
Fig. 1 Relative number of live born children
a (fertility behaviour) and acceptance of voluntary
childlessness
b (fertility attitudes) by survey year.
aRelative number of live born children: The number of
live born babies per thousand of the average number of women aged 15–50 in the period of observation.
Live born child: A baby showing some sign of life after birth, regardless of the duration of pregnancy.
Source Statistics Netherlands at www.cbs.nl/statline.
bSource Cultural Change in the Netherlands (CCN)
surveys
1 Moors (1996) has shown that fertility behaviour and fertility values are strongly correlated on the indi-
vidual level as well.
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123about by cohort replacement or by intra-cohort changes (cf. Firebaugh 1997). Cohort
replacement explains (part of) the overall change if younger birth cohorts are more per-
missive towards voluntary childlessness than older birth cohorts. The underlying
assumption is that values are socialized during childhood and early adulthood and are
relatively resistant to change over the life-course (Inglehart 1977). Intra-cohort change
would explain (part of) the overall change when members of some or allbirth cohorts
become more permissive over a given time-span. Changes in the values of a birth cohort
can come about by two processes, by period effects and by life-course effects. Period
effects are effects of contextual nature that affect all people, young and old, in similar
ways, like economic or political conditions. Life-course effects are age-dependent and
have to do with personal development as affected by experiencing life events such as
marriage, divorce, and having children.
Using repeated cross-sectional data—which is the research design we are using—makes
it possible to distinguish between cohort replacement and intra-cohort effects, for intra-
cohort change shows up as period effects in a regression model in which birth cohort is
controlled for (Firebaugh 1997). It is important to note that the fast increase in the per-
centage of the Dutch population approving voluntary childlessness logically cannot be the
result of cohort replacement only, since the part of the population that has been ‘replaced’
in a period of 30 years is not large enough to account for the major changes that have taken
place. However, it remains very interesting to decompose the general trend into cohort
replacement and intra-cohort changes, and in this paper we set out to answer this question.
The second research question we address in this study is about the declining part of the
population who is not supporting voluntary childlessness. Nowadays, about 90% of the
Dutch population approves a couple’s decision to forgo parenthood. Who are the remaining
10% of the population who do not adhere to the modern value that the individual pref-
erence to remain childless should be respected? To answer this question, we explore
differences in fertility values with respect to gender, family structure, educational attain-
ment, income, and urbanization, and we pay special attention to differences between the
religious and the non-religious parts of the population. Within the religious part of the
population we will investigate differences between the three major denominations in the
Netherlands (Roman Catholics, Dutch Reformed, and Re-reformed), and differences
between churchgoers and those who do not visit church on a regular basis.
By answering these two questions, we hope to gain more insight in the rapid change in
values towards voluntary childlessness. We think that doing research on this topic is
important because of two reasons. First, there is the scholarly fascination to study an
attitude that has changed so fast in such a short period. Second, the origins of social change
for this value are important for society and policy because it is related to decreasing
fertility. To what extent does the development towards less emphasis on pronatalist values
come about by cohort replacement and to what extent by intra-cohort changes (period
effects)? Before we address our research questions empirically, we ﬁrst describe some
major economic and cultural trends that occurred in the Netherlands since the 1950’s,
followed by an outline of the research literature and the prevalent ideas on change in values
about voluntary childlessness.
1.1 Economic and Cultural Modernization in the Netherlands
Between the 1950s and the 1970’s the Netherlands experienced a strong modernization
process, of which we here highlight some important aspects. First, average income
increased rapidly. The development of the Gross National Product per capita, expressed in
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1231999 Euros, shown in Fig. 2, displays this development. In 1950, GNP per capita was
4,470 euro and in 1996 it had increased to 17,950 euro per capita (Statistic Netherlands
2009; own calculations
2). This represents an average growth in income of 3.1% per year,
corrected for inﬂation.
Second, growing income is often seen as the driving force behind value change (Alwin
and Scott 1996; Inglehart 1977; Ryder 1965). Inglehart’s theory of value change argues
that growing prosperity and the fulﬁlment of basic material needs make that younger
generations started to reject so-called materialist values and moved on to post-materialist
values. Important elements of the new value pattern was a focus on personal autonomy,
self-actualisation, and tolerant values. Large proportions of the population drifted away
from traditional values in the 1960s and 1970s (de Graaf 1988; Inglehart 1977, 1990,
1997). An important part of the cultural modernization process was that sex roles have
become less strong. Traditional values about how men and women should lead their lives
have eroded, and women got the same rights as men to work on the labour market (van der
Lippe 1993).
Third, the process of economic and cultural modernization has gone together with a fast
secularization process. The moral guidance of religion in general and of churches and
church leaders in particular has come under pressure, and the clash between modern values
and the ofﬁcial, pro-family, doctrine of religious ideologies lead to secularization. Figure 2
shows that in 1950 18% was non-religious, and that this percentage has increase to 40% in
1996 (Becker and de Hart 2006). In the same period the proportion of churchgoers (at least
monthly) has decreased to less than one fourth of the population.
Fourth, new contraceptive methods, such as oral contraceptives, became available. The
invention of the hormonal birth control pill in the 1950s made that parenthood became
much more a choice rather than a biological phenomenon (Hakim 2003). Oral contra-
ceptives were introduced in the Netherlands in 1962 and were an immediate success
(Rensman 2006). The percentage of women using the birth control pill has risen enor-
mously. In 1962 about 3% of Dutch women in the relevant age category used the birth
control pill. In the 1970s this percentage was about 38%, and 1996 it was 46% (Bronsema
Fig. 2 GDP per capita and the relative number of nonreligious people by year. Source Statistics
Netherlands at www.cbs.nl/statline
2 To calculate GNP per capita, we ﬁrst divided national income by population size. In addition, we also
corrected for changes in purchasing power using the Consumer Price Index.
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123and Moors 1994; Rensman 2006). It is against this background of economic and cultural
modernization that we analyse the rapid change in the acceptance of childlessness.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Shifts in the Public Acceptance of Childlessness: Cohort Replacement
Effects and Intra-Cohort Change
The ﬁrst plausible explanation for changing societal acceptance levels of voluntary
childlessness is related to cohort membership and the succession of cohorts (Firebaugh
1997). A cohort can be deﬁned as the aggregate of individuals born in a certain period of
time (Ryder 1965). Each cohort group experiences different societal events during the
socialization stage, i.e. childhood and adolescence (Rodgers 1982). These so-called for-
mative years leave an imprinting stamp on a person’s beliefs, values and attitudes (Ryder
1965), as these values reﬂect the social and economic circumstances in society during
socialization (Inglehart 1977) and are assumed to crystallize into stable orientations which
become resistant to change (Alwin 1990). This argument assumes that cohort groups differ
in their fertility values because they were raised in distinctive historical periods. Research
indeed shows that older cohorts tend to be more conservative and traditional (Inglehart
1977, 1990), and therefore are more likely to disapprove of voluntary childlessness.
Younger cohorts, on the other hand, hold more liberal and modern views and are more
tolerant towards couples who forgo parenthood. In this perspective, social change may
occur because of the natural process of cohort replacement. As a consequence of birth,
new, more liberal cohorts enter society and replace the older, more traditional ones who die
out, leading to a gradual shift in the acceptance of voluntary childlessness. As this process
of change happens slowly and steadily Inglehart (1977), called it ‘a silent revolution’.
A second source of social change describes a process that may lead to a more revo-
lutionary shift in society, namely through changes within cohorts (intra-cohort effects;
Firebaugh 1997). This process refers to attitudinal changes that affect all members present
at a certain time in society, regardless of their cohort group (Glenn 1977). When changes in
values in response to changes in the macro societal circumstances are not restricted to the
young generation but refer to older people as well, this can lead to a rapid change of values
in society. It is important to note that this process also implies that people dispose of a
lifelong openness to attitude change in contrast to the notion of cohort replacement, which
assumes attitudinal stability after young adulthood (Visser and Krosnick 1998).
In this paper, we will estimate the contribution of both cohort replacement effects and
intra-cohort change to the shift in acceptance levels of voluntary childlessness in the
Netherlandsfrom1965till1996.Wehypothesizethatintra-cohorteffectscontribute moreto
this societal change than cohort replacement effects, as the shift towards higher acceptance
levels is very large in the period 1965–1980. Changes related to cohort replacement are
simplytakingplacetooslowtoaccountforthisrapidattitudinalchange.From1980onwards,
changesinfertilityvaluesarelesspronounced,whichimpliesthatcohortreplacementeffects
could become more important than intra-cohort effects in this period.
2.2 Who are Intolerant Towards Voluntary Childlessness?
Given the high public acceptance levels of voluntary childlessness in the 1990s, our second
research question is about those who remain intolerant and do not accept voluntary
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123childlessness. First, we will look at socio-demographic characteristics. Previous research
has found that gender, family structure, educational level, income, and urbanization are
linked to fertility values. Women have more positive attitudes towards childlessness than
men, presumably because of higher opportunity costs (Koropeckyj-Cox and Pendell 2007;
Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001).
Next to economic costs such as lost wages and career advancement (the so-called
‘‘motherhood penalty’’, (see e.g.: Budig and England 2001), mothers in general are more
involved in parenting than fathers, leading to greater personal costs in terms of time
commitment, sacriﬁce and stress (Crittenden 2001). We also expect that people living with
a partner and/or children have lower acceptance levels compared to people that are not in a
stable relationship or who are childless (Beets et al. 1999).
Furthermore, individuals with higher educational levels and higher socio-economic
positions are thought to be more tolerant than less privileged people. Education increases
one’s ‘‘breath of perspective’’ (Gabennesch 1972, 859) and makes more critical towards
traditional values and more open to new ideas and arguments. Finally, people living in
urbanized areas are expected to hold more tolerant views, because of the more densely
populated and socially heterogeneous environment they live in (cf. Carter and Borch 2005;
Wilson 1985). This implies that city-dwellers are more likely to show higher levels of
approval of voluntary childlessness than people living in rural communities.
Next to these socio-demographic characteristics, religion seems to be a key factor when
explaining fertility behaviour or values (cf. Zhang 2008). Religious ideologies all spread
pro-family messages, but the strength of these messages depends on the speciﬁc religious
doctrine of a denomination. In the Netherlands, three Christian denominations can be
distinguished: Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed (Nederlands Hervormden, generally the
more liberal Protestants) and Re-reformed (Gereformeerden, generally the more orthodox
Protestants). The Roman Catholic Church propagates a pronatalistic point of view which
encourages members to have a large family and is known for its clear statements against
contraception and abortion (Pearce 2002; Zhang 2008). This pronatalist doctrine was
especially strong in the Netherlands, as Roman Catholics occupied a minority position in
Dutch society. After an era of persecution, the Roman Catholic Church was granted equal
rights in 1795 and tried to strengthen its institutions and societal position in the 19th and ﬁrst
half of the twentieth century (Barrett et al. 2001). Catholic clergy actively promoted high
fertility rates, for example by visiting married couples without children and by campaigning
against breastfeeding (cf. Schellekens and Poppel van 2006). In the 1960s, the Dutch
Catholic Church tried to modernize in order to keep up with changes in society, but the
inﬂuence of liberal movements was ended by Vatican appointments of conservative bish-
ops. In 1968, the ofﬁcial doctrine of the Catholic Church with respect to marriage and birth
control was reafﬁrmed in the papal encyclical ‘‘Humanae Vitae’’ (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Humanae_Vitae).
Strong pronatalist views can also be expected in the group of the Re-reformed, who are
divided among several religious communities and churches due to historical schisms
(Barrett et al. 2001). These orthodox Protestants see the bible as the infallible word of God,
which serves as a strict moral guidance. They strongly believe in God’s Providence, which
makes that interventions in matters of life and death are unacceptable. The Re-reformed
therefore have clear doctrines against contraception and abortion, whereas family life and
children are viewed as very important. In addition, the high level of social control in Re-
reformed communities reinforces religious norms regarding fertility. For example, in
regular house calls, family members and delegates of the church talk about religious
matters in personal life.
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123The largest group of Protestants in the Netherlands, the Dutch Reformed, can be
characterized as more liberal when it comes to fertility issues. First of all, liberal Prot-
estants have been associated with rationalist and pragmatic values (cf. McQuillian 1999).
The Dutch Reformed are encouraged to take responsibility in handling the problems of
everyday life and not rely on traditional doctrine alone (de Loor 1981). In addition,
theological multiformity within the Dutch Reformed Church grew since the nineteenth
century (de Loor 1981), which makes it less obvious for its members to adhere to one
ofﬁcial doctrine. This pattern is strengthened by the internal structure of the Dutch
Reformed Church, which is less hierarchical and more democratic than for example in the
Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, in order to read the bible thoroughly, the Dutch
Reformed place great emphasis on literacy and education, which gives way to more
tolerant views. Finally van Bavel and Kok (2005), mention that the Dutch Reformed see
marriage as a bond with mutual support between spouses, which gives room for discussion
about birth control.
We expect these religiosity effects to work in several ways. First, people who were
raised and socialized in a Roman Catholic, Re-reformed, or Dutch Reformed context,
should be affected by the way their church thinks about fertility issues, even if they later in
life left their religious denomination. We expect that they are less tolerant towards vol-
untary childlessness than individuals who were not socialized religiously, and within the
group of religiously socialized, that those who were raised in a Roman Catholic or Re-
reformed environment are less tolerant than those socialized in a Dutch Reformed context.
The same parallel can be drawn for current religious membership. Individuals not
belonging to a denomination are expected to show the highest levels of acceptance of
voluntary childlessness, whereas the Dutch Reformed are thought to be more tolerant than
Roman Catholics and Re-reformed. These denomination effects are expected to be stronger
for those visiting religious institutions regularly. Churches create the opportunity to meet
other people with the same religious background. Therefore, visiting religious services
stimulates social interaction with people adhering to similar religious ideas. These close-
knit networks will further strengthen religious norms regarding fertility. As a consequence,
members will adopt the fertility behaviour patterns and values displayed by their network
(Zhang 2008).
3 Data
To answer our research questions, we use thirteen waves of the Cultural Change in the
Netherlands (CCN) survey (Social and Cultural Planning Ofﬁce 1996). The CCN data were
collected in 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, and
1996, and consist of national representative surveys of Dutch adults age 17 and over. The
CCN surveys contain information on values related to politics, social policy, work, and
family, and enable us to construct a rich and highly comparable sample, since no changes
in survey design or wording of questions were made during the period 1965–1996. The
number of respondents ranges from 1,517 to 2,418 per year. Our aggregate sample consists
of respondents, and 24,016 respondents have valid data on all variables.
Our main variable of interest is the acceptance of voluntary childlessness. It is measured
by the item: ‘A married couple decides to not have children, while there are no medical
restrictions. Do you approve or disapprove?’ with answer categories (1) ‘approve’, (2) ‘it
depends (on circumstances)’, and (3) ‘do not approve’. Table 1 shows that unconditioned
approval of childlessness has increased by more than 67% in the period 1965–1996. In
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1231965, 23% tolerated childlessness without further consideration of the circumstances; in
1996 this ﬁgure had risen to 90%. As Fig. 1 showed, most of the change in acceptance of
voluntary childlessness has occurred between 1965 and 1980, in the beginning of our
observation window. A closer examination of the data shows that respondents became
more pronounced in their approval of couples who decide to forgo parenthood. People in
the 1980s and 1990s either approved or disapproved of childlessness, because on average
the portion of respondents in the ‘it depends’ category is larger at the beginning and
smaller at the end of the time span of our trend analysis. In 1996, it seems that nowadays a
vast majority in the Netherlands approves voluntary childlessness.
For the analysis of intra-cohort change, we construct thirteen time periods indicating the
year of survey. In addition, eight cohort groups are deﬁned to measure cohort replacement
effects: respondents born (1) before 1910, (2) 1910–1919, (3) 1920–1929, (4) 1930–1939,
(5) 1940–1949, (6) 1950–1959, (7) 1960–1969, and (8) 1970 or later.
3.1 Individual Characteristics
In our analysis to answer the research question about the social categories who are (still)
not accepting voluntary childlessness, we focus on the last 6 years of the time span in the
data: 1991–1996. Appendix gives an overview of the distributions of the individual level
explanatory variables. Gender is a dichotomous variable with one indicating women.
Partner status is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the respondent is in a
long-term relationship (i.e. cohabitating or married). The household composition variable
refers to respondent’s current household composition, i.e. the number of children living
with the respondent at the time of the survey. This makes is difﬁcult to compare people
with and without children, because respondents not living with a child at the time of the
survey can either be childless or in the empty nest stage. Therefore, we subdivide
respondents not living with at least one child in two age groups. Respondents older than 40
are assumed to have children and to be in the empty nest stage, whereas younger indi-
viduals (age 40 at most) are thought to have not entered parenthood yet. Unfortunately,
both age groups will include respondents who never had or will have children, but our data
has no indicator for this. This means that household composition is measured in four
categories, namely (1) ‘no children, respondent is forty at most’, (2) ‘no children;
respondent is older than forty’, (3) ‘one or two child(ren)’ and (4) ‘three or more children’.
Educational level is divided into four categories; (1) primary education and lower voca-
tional education, (2) lower secondary education, (3) higher secondary education and
middle vocational education and (4) university or higher vocational education. Income is
measured as the logged annual gross household income in Dutch guilders and is corrected
for inﬂation rates. Finally, urbanization is coded as an indicator with one referring to a
resident of one of the three largest cities in the Netherlands, namely Amsterdam, Rotter-
dam, or The Hague. Religious socialization is measured by asking respondents whether
they were raised and socialized with a speciﬁc religious belief. Religious denomination is
assessed with the question: ‘Do you consider yourself as belonging to a religious
denomination?’ Both religious socialization and denomination are coded in ﬁve categories:
(1) none, (2) Roman Catholic, (3) Dutch Reformed, (4) Re-reformed and (5) Other.
3
Church attendance is measured by the question ‘How often do you usually (e.g. last
3 Although the surveys give no further information on other denominations, national statistics show that
these predominantly consist of other Christians such as Pentecostals and Jehovah’s witnesses, and—to a
lesser extent—Muslims (Barrett et al. 2001).
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1236 months) attend church?’ Respondents are divided in two categories, namely those
attending church once a month or more often, and those who visit church never or less than
once a month.
3.2 Analytic Strategy
To answer our ﬁrst research question, which focuses on the major sources of change in
public support for voluntary childlessness, we assess intra-cohort and cohort replacement
effects using the repeated cross-sectional CCN data
4 in two steps. First, we estimate net
intra-cohort and cohort replacement effects by including survey year and cohort groups in a
multinomial logistic regression analysis: y = b0 ? b1 year ? b2 cohort ? e. This step will
also show whether intra-cohort change is linear and additive, a prerequisite for our second
step, in which we use the slopes of the aforementioned equation to calculate the relative
importance of both sources of social change (Firebaugh 1997). In this linear decomposi-
tion, the contribution of intra-cohort change is measured by the formula b1 (YRt - YR1).
The term between brackets represents the number of years between the ﬁrst and the ﬁnal
wave of the survey, i.e. 1996–1965 = 31 in our data. The coefﬁcient b1 refers to intra-
cohort change per year. Thus, by multiplying b1 with the total number of survey years in
our sample, the total or relative contribution of intra-cohort change can be obtained. For
estimating cohort replacement, we use the formula b2 (Ct - C1), with b2 indicating the
change in acceptance of voluntary childlessness per birth year. (Ct - C1) refers to the
difference in the average of birth years in the 1965 survey and the average of birth years in
the 1996 survey.
To answer our second research question about which respondents nowadays are intol-
erant of voluntary childlessness in a tolerant society, individual level variables are included
in a multinomial logistic regression model for the survey years 1991–1996.
4 Results
4.1 Main Sources of Social Change
Table 2 presents the results of our base line multinomial logistic regression model. Model 1
includes only the survey years as a predictor variable, and in Model 2 birth cohort is added.
Model 1 repeats the results which were already visible in Fig. 1 and Table 1: There has
been a strong increase in the acceptance of voluntary childlessness. Model 2 is more
interestingly: The results show that there are strong period and cohort effects with regard to
the acceptance of voluntary childlessness, and that the differences between the survey
years are only partially explained by the inclusion of birth cohort in the regression
equation. We observe that the rise in acceptance of childlessness is most prominent
4 Firebaugh (1997) argues that the analysis of repeated cross-sectional data can only serve as a tool to
identify intra-cohort change and cohort replacement effects, if change within birth cohorts is not due to a
changing composition of the population as caused by mortality and migration. Migration can be assumed to
be of little consequence since Dutch immigration as well as emigration levels are less than one percent of the
total population in the period 1900–1996 (Statistics Netherlands at www.cbs.nl/statline). Mortality is cor-
related with educational attainment and gender. Since the (probably) more tolerant groups (the high edu-
cated and women) survive the less tolerant groups the negative effect of cohorts may be overestimated,
which means that the proportion of the total change that is attributed to intra-cohort change is overestimated
to an unknown extent.
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123between 1965 and 1975. The level of acceptance has increased after 1975 as well but with
a far lower momentum than before. In addition, Table 2 reveals that younger birth cohorts
have stronger acceptance than older cohorts.
Our base line regression models makes clear that there are both intra-cohort and cohort
replacement effects at work. But which one is more dominant in explaining the cultural
shift towards more acceptance of voluntary childlessness? In order to ﬁnd out the relative
contribution of intra-cohort and cohort replacement effects, we use the linear decompo-
sition method proposed by Firebaugh (1997). First, we have to determine whether the
linear-additive assumption underlying this method is appropriate for our set of intra-cohort
and cohort replacement variables. Based on the multinomial logistic regression results
shown in Table 2, it can be concluded that there is no clear linear relationship between
acceptance levels of voluntary childlessness and survey year over the whole period 1965–
1995, but that there are two sub-periods in which the relationship is linear. Between 1965
and 1980 there has been a sharp increase in acceptance levels, whereas the period between
1983 and 1996 there has been a more moderate increase.
Table 2 Multinomial logistic regression analysis on acceptance of voluntary childlessness: Net intra-cohort
and cohort replacement effects, 1965–1996
Model 1 Model 2
Unacceptable vs
acceptable
It depends vs
acceptable
Unacceptable vs
acceptable
It depends vs
acceptable
Survey year (ref: 1965)
1970 -1.830*** -.868*** -1.696*** -.767***
1975 -2.668*** -.728*** -2.478*** -.582***
1980 -3.315*** -.990*** -2.970*** -.740***
1983 -3.649*** -1.457*** -3.233*** -1.164***
1985 -3.590*** -1.524*** -3.098*** -1.184***
1987 -3.728*** -1.590*** -3.188*** -1.230***
1991 -3.811*** -1.752*** -3.192*** -1.358***
1992 -4.406*** -1.101*** -3.754*** -.690***
1993 -4.090*** -1.944*** -3.418*** -1.524***
1994 -3.955*** -1.889*** -3.271*** -1.467***
1995 -4.155*** -2.118*** -3.455*** -1.688***
1996 -4.214*** -1.844*** -3.522*** -1.421***
Cohort (ref:\1910)
1910–1919 -.288*** -.204
1920–1929 -.562*** -.298**
1930–1939 -.729*** -.475***
1940–1949 -1.310*** -1.009***
1950–1959 -1.692*** -1.178***
1960–1969 -1.778*** -1.117***
[=1970 -1.677*** -.858***
Chi
2 (df) 4,393 (24) 5,063 (38)
N 24,016 24,016
Source: Cultural change in The Netherlands
* p\0.10; ** p\0.05; *** p\0.01
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123Table 3 presents the results of the linear decomposition for the total period (1965–
1996) and for the two sub-periods 1965–1980 and 1983–1995 separately. We focus on
the difference between the ‘acceptable’ and the ‘unacceptable’ category, as here the
shifts are most pronounced. The upper part of the table shows the multinomial logistic
regression results on which the calculations in the lower part of the table are based.
These calculations yield striking results. Almost 90% of the change in acceptance of
voluntary childlessness between 1965 and 1980 stems from intra-cohort change, whereas
cohort replacement seems to be of less importance. The second time period, starting
from 1983 and ending in 1996, shows a reversed pattern with cohort replacement effects
overshadowing intra-cohort change (64% vs. 36%). Here, shifts in fertility values are
mainly due to the replacement of older, more conservative cohort groups with younger,
more tolerant ones.
4.2 Determinants of Intolerance
So far, we focused on the enormous increase in tolerance towards voluntary childlessness
and the main causes of this growth. At this point, the question rises which members of
society are intolerant, since our results suggest that permissiveness regarding childless-
ness has dominated Dutch society since the 1990s. Approximately 90% of the Dutch
population unconditionally approves a couple’s decision to forgo parenthood. Table 4
gives the multinomial logistic regression results for the period 1991–1996. We focus on
the coefﬁcients in the left column, where the two most extreme answer categories are
compared. First, we see that in the 1990s birth cohort still is of considerable importance
after controlling for other individual level characteristics. People who were born before
1940 show lower levels of acceptance than those who were born before that moment in
time.
When looking at the socio-demographic variables, we see that women do not seem
to be more tolerant towards couple’s fertility decisions than men are. In addition,
having a partner or not does not affect one’s view on voluntary childlessness, but
having children does. Living with three or more children leads to higher levels of
disapproval in comparison to respondents living with no, one, or two children. In
addition, the higher educated show lower levels of disapproving childlessness than the
lower educated. People with a higher income are more tolerant towards voluntary
childlessness as well. Finally, living in one of the three largest cities in the Netherlands
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam or The Hague) has no signiﬁcant effect on the chance of
approving childlessness.
When we turn our focus to religion, we see that religious socialization increases one’s
negative attitudes toward childlessness only for respondents who were brought up with
the religious ideas of other denominations than the three large ones in the Netherlands.
Contrary to what we expected, people socialized in a Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed,
or Re-reformed environment do not have higher chances of rejecting childlessness
compared to those who are not religiously socialized. Of course, these zero effects are
only present in a model that controls for current religiosity and for current church
attendance, but it is remarkable that religious socialization does not have an additional
impact on values that are so directly related to religious doctrines.
When we turn to current religiosity we observe that persons who say they have a
religious denomination but who do not attend church services regularly are not less
174 S. Noordhuizen et al.
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123Table 4 Multinomial logistic regression analysis on acceptance of voluntary childlessness: Effects of
individual characteristics, 1991–1996
Model 12
Unacceptable vs acceptable It depends vs acceptable
Cohort (ref: 1910–1919)
1920–1929 -.348 .006
1930–1939 -.413 .045
1940–1949 -1.230*** -.359
1950–1959 -1.616*** -.682**
1960–1969 -1.169*** -.465
[=1970 -.991** -.173
Gender (ref: men)
Women -.299 -.090
Partner status (ref: no partner)
Partner .151 .017
Household composition (ref: 1 or 2 child(ren))
No children[40 years -.037 -.065
No children\=40 years -.228 .006
3 or more children .619*** .337**
Educational level (ref: primary education)
Lower secondary/vocational education -.675*** -.384***
Higher secondary/vocational education -1.069*** -.796***
University -.994*** -1.289***
Income
Logged annual gross household income -.532*** -.553***
Urbanization (ref: not living in three largest cities)
Living in three largest cities -.228 .132
Religious socialization (ref: none)
Roman Catholic .094 -.269*
Dutch Reformed -.122 -.022
Re-reformed .601 .364*
Other 1.054*** .890**
Religious denomination 9 church attendance (ref: none)
Roman Catholic 9 no regular church attendance .281 .890***
Roman Catholic 9 regular church attendance .830*** 1.402***
Dutch Reformed 9 no regular church attendance .421 .397*
Dutch Reformed 9 regular church attendance 1.079*** 1.082***
Re-reformed 9 no regular church attendance -.548 .675**
Re-reformed 9 regular church attendance 1.783*** 1.219***
Other 9 no regular church attendance .789 .475
Other 9 regular church attendance 1.476*** .960***
Chi
2 (df) 1,071 (58)
N 10,782
Source: Cultural change in The Netherlands
* p\0.10;** p\0.05;*** p\0.01
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123tolerant when it comes to fertility values than non-religious people
5. This holds for Roman
Catholics, Dutch Reformed, Re-reformed, as well as individuals belonging to other
denominations. However, when people who belong to a religious denomination visit
church at least once a month, they exhibit signiﬁcant lower acceptance levels of voluntary
childlessness. This pattern is particularly strong for the Re-reformed, as might be expected,
and less pronounced for Roman Catholics.
In sum, religiosity is clearly related to one’s view regarding voluntary childlessness. It
appears that church attendance makes the difference: Those attending religious services
regularly report lower levels of acceptance compared to those not visiting church on a
regular basis. When examining acceptance levels between 1991 and 1996, we ﬁnd that
more than half of those disapproving childlessness visits church often. Table 5 also reveals
that educational level is related to one’s view regarding childlessness since the lower
educated are more likely to disapprove childlessness than the higher educated.
5 Summary and Conclusions
First, the Cultural Change in the Netherlands data reveals an enormous increase in tolerance
towards childlessness. In 1965, less than one in four respondents accepted childlessness
withoutfurther consideration ofthe circumstances, whilethis percentage approaches 90% in
1996. Furthermore, to explain growing acceptance of childlessness, we focused on intra-
cohort and cohort replacement effects. The analyses yield several interesting results.
With respect to the results of the linear decomposition, it can be concluded that changes
within cohorts are mainly responsible for the shift in the acceptance of childlessness
between 1965 and 1980. The change in public opinion regarding childlessness in this
period is not so much caused by replacement or succession of different groups within
society. Instead, members within existing groups (cohorts) changed their fertility values
due to speciﬁc factors of a contextual nature that affected all members of society (i.e.
period effects), and this caused a decrease in the rejection of childlessness at the national
level. For clarifying the change in acceptance of childlessness between 1983 and 1996 a
different explanation applies. Here, the increase in acceptance is mainly due to
Table 5 Acceptance levels (%) by church attendance and educational attainment, CCN 1991–1996)
Do not approve It depends Accept Total
No regular church attendance
Lower educated 34.9 (174) 44.5 (342) 47.4 (4758) 46.7 (5274)
Higher educated 7.8 (39) 10.0 (77) 32.0 (3216) 29.5 (3332)
Regular church attendance
Lower educated 46.4 (231) 35.5 (273) 13.8 (1381) 16.7 (1885)
Higher educated 10.8 (54) 9.9 (76) 6.8 (684) 7.2 (814)
Total 100 (498) 100 (768) 100 (10.0039) 100 (11.305)
Source: Cultural changes in the Netherlands (CCN), 1991–1996
5 Roman Catholics, Dutch Reformed, Re-reformed, and those belonging to other religious denominations are
morelikelythannon-religiouspeopletoanswer‘‘itdepends(oncircumstances)’’ratherthan‘‘acceptable’’ when
it asked about voluntary childlessness. Apparently, the ﬁrst group has more reservations when it comes to
approvingofacouple’sdecisiontoforgoparenthood.Thispatternisstrengthenedbyattendingchurchregularly.
However, since our focus is on the intolerant in a tolerant society, we do not discuss these results in detail.
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123replacement of older, more conservative cohorts by younger, more tolerant cohorts,
referring to the changing composition of society.
We conclude that the dramatic change in the acceptance of voluntary childlessness is
part of the major changes that took place in the Netherlands in the sixties and seventies,
before levelling off during the eighties and nineties. These economic and demographic
macro mechanisms work in two ways: ﬁrst, by inﬂuencing values on voluntary child-
lessness during socialization (cohort replacement effect) and by inﬂuencing these values
later in life (intra-cohort change).
Because of high acceptance levelsat the end of our survey period (1991–1996), the question
rises who remains intolerant in a tolerant society. As expected, respondents with three or more
children and those with lower socio-economic positions (lower education and income levels)
show higher chances of disapproving voluntary childlessness. Gender, partner status, and
urbanization do not affect people’s fertility values. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that religion is an
importance predictor of permissiveness, although its effects are less pronounced than we
anticipated.Forexample,weobservehardlyanyinﬂuenceofbeingbroughtupwithinareligious
context.Inaddition,membersofareligiousdenominationdonotperseexhibitlowerchancesof
accepting voluntary childlessness than non-religious people. It is church attendance that seems
to be the key factor when it comes to explaining fertility values. Members of a religious
denomination who attend church services once a month or more have higher levels of disfa-
vouring voluntary childlessness, and members who do not visit church regularly on average
have the same values as the non-religious. The signiﬁcance of church attendance cannot be
overstated. By visiting church, religious people are exposed to the pro-family messages of
religiousdenominationsmoreextensivelyandmorefrequently.Thispatternismostpronounced
for the Re-reformed, for who we anticipated strong pronatalist views in the ﬁrst place.
Althoughthisstudyhasshedmorelightonthecausesofchangingfertilityvalues,thisarticle
also leads to suggestions for future research. First, the CCN survey does not provide any
information on the acceptance of childlessness from 1996 onwards. It is not very likely that the
percentage of the Dutch population who accept voluntary childlessness will further increase,
given the high level at the end of our time span. However, it would be interesting to assess
whether a counter trend towards more conservative fertility values emerged. Our ﬁnding that
theyoungesttwocohorts(bornin1960orlater)arelesstoleranttowardsvoluntarychildlessness
than the cohorts born earlier points in this direction. In addition, a counter trend has been found
in the Netherlands for other values, such as sexual permissiveness (Kraaykamp 2002).
Second, the results in this study should be interpreted with caution because of social
desirability. Although it is quite unlikely that the observed radical change in acceptance of
voluntary childlessness in the Netherlands can be accounted for by changing perceptions
about social desirability—norms about desirability only change unless values are also
changing (Firebaugh 1997)—our results might be biased due to the fact that respondents
have the tendency to give answers that are compatible with norms in society. Our sample
may thus have reported to be more tolerant in fertility values than they actually are. The
question rises whether respondents will still be as tolerant towards childlessness if it takes
place in their own environment, for instance when close family members decide to have no
children. Will parents disapprove their children’s decision to forgo parenthood? This is
why future research should focus more on the impact of social networks on individual’s
childbearing dispositions and on actual fertility.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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See Table 6
Table 6 Descriptive statistics, 1991–1996 (n = 10,782)
Mean S.D.
Cohort (1/0)
1910–1919 0.01
1920–1929 0.10
1930–1939 0.13
1940–1949 0.17
1950–1959 0.25
1960–1969 0.21
[=1970 0.13
Gender (1/0)
Women 0.55
Partner status (1/0)
Respondent has partner 0.67
Household composition (1/0)
1 or 2 child(ren) 0.41
No children[40 years 0.30
No children\=40 years 0.19
3 or more children 0.10
Educational level (1/0)
Primary education 0.32
Lower secondary/vocational education 0.32
Higher secondary/vocational education 0.23
University 013
Income (in Dutch guilders)
Annual gross household income 66,476 35,380
Urbanization (1/0)
Living in three largest cities 0.13
Religious socialization (1/0)
None 0.29
Roman Catholic 0.39
Dutch Reformed 0.19
Re-reformed 0.10
Other 0.03
Religious denomination (1/0)
None 0.61
Roman Catholic 0.21
Dutch Reformed 0.10
Re-reformed 0.07
Other 0.02
Church attendance (1/0)
On a regular basis 0.24
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